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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE CITY OF WEST JORDAN et al 
Plaintiffs-Appellants 
vs 
THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT OFFICE 
Defendants -Repondents 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
No. 20078 
Pursuant t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f Ru le 35 o f t h e Ru les o f 
t h e U tah Supreme C o u r t , t h e P l a i n t i f f s - A p p e l l a n t s h e r e b y 
p e t i t i o n t h e C o u r t f o r r e h e a r i n g o f i t s d e c i s i o n f i l e d on 
December 3 0 , 1988 . 
T h i s P e t i t i o n f o r Rehear ing i s based upon t h e f o l l o w i n g 
i s s u e s : 
1 . The C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n o v e r l o o k e d or 
m i s a p p r e h e n d e d t h e A p p e l l a n t ' s c i t a t i o n o f U tah 
case law d e c i s i o n " a u t h o r i t y * c o n c e r n i n g the i s s u e 
o f c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f m u n i c i p a l i t i e s . 
2 . The C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n o v e r l o o k e d or 
misapprehended t he A p p e l l a n t ' s argument c o n c e r n i n g 
t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e l e g a t i o n o f p o w e r s , i n 
v i o l a t i o n o f t he s o - c a l l e d Ripper C l a u s e . 
3 . The C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n f a i l s t o a d d r e s s 
s i g n i f i c a n t f e d e r a l (and s t a t e ) c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
i s s u e s , p r i m a r i l y h i g h l i g h t e d by t h e d e c i s i o n o f 
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme Cour t i n t h e case o f 
F i r s t E n g l i s h L u t h e r a n E v a n g e l i c a l Church o f 
Glendale vs County of Los Angeles, U.S. 
(1987), decided by the United States Supreme Court 
after the briefs in this case were filed. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
Concerning the "classification of municipalities" issue, 
the Court wrote: 
The cl assifie at ion-on-the-basis-of-population 
requirement of article XI, section 5 only applies 
to laws that classify municipalities for the 
purpose of defining their powers and functions and 
directs that if such laws make distinctions between 
the powers of various municipalities, those 
distinctions must be on the basis of population 
only. Our review of the state constitution and 
relevant precedent has revealed no authority that 
contradicts this interpretation of article XI, 
section 5, and West Jordan has cited none. 
Emphasis added. 
In their original brief, Appellants quoted at length 
from this Court's decision in the case of Wadsworth vs 
Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161 (1933). The 
discussion of the implications of Wadsworth are discussed at 
length on page 26 of the Appellant's original brief and needs 
not to be herein recited. Indeed, the language cited by 
Appellants from Wadsworth is exactly on point with the 
Court's statement of principle, quoted above. 
However, the Court's decision is internally 
inconsistent: the Court concludes that Senate Bill 327 does 
not offend the "classification" limitation of the Utah 
2 
Constitution. But when one carefully considers what Senate 
Bill 327 does, it does not fit within the standard of the 
Court's own test, quoted above. 
For example, Senate Bill 327 by mandating 
participation in the state retirement system for some 
municipalities and allowing others to not participate has, 
in essence, specified the "powers" and "functions" of 
municipalities. Some cities, like West Jordan, are obligated 
to participate in the state retirement system; other cities, 
such as Ephraim, are not. West Jordan is obligated to forever 
participate in the state retirement system, regardless of the 
decision of its local elected officials to the contrary. It 
must retain that participation and make the statutory 
contributions corresponding thereto. 
Thus, under the terms of Senate Bill 327, West Jordan 
City has one set of "powers" and "functions", whereas Ephraim 
City has another set of "powers" and "functions". 
In a similar vein, West Jordan is obligated to 
contribute to the "police" retirement fund at a different 
rate than is Bountiful, similarly a "third-class" city of 
approximately the same population. West Jordan has one 
"function" (i.e. to contribute to the "police" retirement 
system at the rate of 7.59% of peace officer payroll) and 
Bountiful has a different "function" (to contribute at a rate 
of 5.59JS). [Section 49-4-301, Utah Code] WHY SHOULD WEST 
JORDAN BE OBLIGATED TO PAY AT A HIGHER RATE THAN A SISTER 
MUNICIPALITY? Because of actuarial studies? That's not the 
"population" criteria clearly established in Wadsworth and 
re-affirmed by the Court in the analysis (but certainly not 
the result) in the instant case! 
The criterion upon which those cities in the one 
category have the "powers" and "functions" and upon which 
cities in the other category have different "powers" and 
"functions" is not based upon "population", as the 
Constitution requires. 
If the Court's conclusion that the Legislature's 
determination as to a classification of municipalities may be 
upon any basis as is "reasonable and is related to the 
legislation's purpose" [as the Court's opinion in Footnote 3 
implies], then the constitutional standard of "population" 
becomes meaningless. It is highly suspect that the Framers 
carefully inserted a standard they intended the Court to 
ignore! 
The Court's opinion correctly notes that: 
West Jordan's attack is facial, i.e., it merely 
says that the distinctions exist and therefore they 
must be invalid. By failing to support its argument 
with any reasoning or authority, West Jordan would 
have us shift the burden of justifying these 
distinctions to the Board. 
98 Utah Advance Reports at 41. West Jordan's pleaded, briefed 
and cited authority on this issue IS THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
ITSELF. That document says "population". And this Court in 
Wadsworth, supra, correctly noted that the "only basis" for 
classifying municipalities was "population". There can be no 
greater "authority" than the basic organic document. The City 
did not mean to imply that the Retirement Board had any 
"burden of justifying" the classification scheme not based on 
"population", as there can be no justification for violating 
the clear provisions of the Constitution! 
Senate Bill 327, when carefully analyzed, violates the 
Court's own standard. The Court should re-examine Senate Bill 
327 against the standards the Court has re-established. 
II 
The C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n s t a t e s : 
We r e j e c t , as a g e n e r a l m a t t e r , t h e sea rch f o r 
any h a r d and f a s t c a t e g o r i z a t i o n o f s p e c i f i c 
f u n c t i o n s as " m u n i c i p a l " o r " s t a t e . " I n s t e a d , i n 
d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r a f u n c t i o n i s m u n i c i p a l , we 
t h i n k i t a p p r o p r i a t e t o t ake a b a l a n c i n g a p p r o a c h , 
one which c o n s i d e r s a number o f f a c t o r s t h a t a r e 
p e r t i n e n t t o t h e s p e c i f i c l e g i s l a t i o n a t i s s u e . 
These i n c l u d e , but are not l i m i t e d t o , t h e r e l a t i v e 
a b i l i t i e s o f t he s t a t e and m u n i c i p a l governments t o 
p e r f o r m t h e f u n c t i o n , t h e d e g r e e t o w h i c h t h e 
p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h e f u n c t i o n a f f e c t s t h e i n t e r e s t s 
o f t hose beyond t he b o u n d a r i e s o f t he m u n i c i p a l i t y , 
and t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e l e g i s l a t i o n unde r 
a t t a c k w i l l i n t r u d e upon the a b i l i t y of the people 
w i t h i n t h e m u n i c i p a l i t y t o c o n t r o l through t h e i r 
e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s t h e s u b s t a n t i v e p o l i c i e s t h a t 
a f f e c t them u n i q u e l y . Th is l a s t f a c t o r s h o u l d serve 
t o ensure due de fe rence t o a pa ramoun t p u r p o s e o f 
t h e r i p p e r c l a u s e , as i t has been i n t e r p r e t e d i n 
U t a h : " t o p r e v e n t i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h l o c a l 
s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t . " 
98 Utah Advance Repor ts a t 4 0 . Emphasis added. 
When Senate B i l l 327 i s examined a g a i n s t t hese c r i t e r i a , 
i t must c l e a r l y f a i l . 
The C o u r t m i s p e r c e i v e d t h e f a c t s . The S t a t e has no 
" l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e minimum l e v e l o f 
r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s p r o v i d e d by p u b l i c e m p l o y e e s by i t s 
p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s . " At l e a s t , t h e S t a t e ( t h r o u g h t h e 
Legislature) has not so stated. THERE IS ^ 0 ALL-ENCOMPASSING 
LEGISLATION WHICH MANDATES THAT ALL EMPLOYEES OF ALL 
POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS MUST BE COVERED IN A RETIREMENT 
SYSTEM. The State isn't concerned that the employees have 
some coverage in a retirement system; that decision is left 
up to the local officials. But if the local government 
decides to offer any retirement program, albeit so small, the 
State supposedly has a "legitimate" interest and mandates 
contributions, at rates which may be greatly in excess of the 
local governments' abilities to pay! 
The fact^ (and analogy to) that the State mandates 
certain minimum requirements, understandably applicable to 
municipalities, concerning worker's compensation, 
unemployment benefits coverage, and occupational safety are 
inapplicable to the instant statutory scheme of selective 
c overage. Would the "worker's comp" , "unemployment", or 
"OSHA" statutes be upheld, if they provided for coverage of 
only a designated percentage of the workers, and allowed the 
employer to exclude up to "ten percent" of his employees from 
the operations of those statutes? The Court must keep in mind 
that there are absolutely no specified criteria for those 
"exclusions". 
Whether the employees of a given municipality are 
covered by retirement benefits affects no one beyond the 
boundaries of that municipality. Senate Bill 327 violates the 
Court's own articulated standard. 
1 Noted in Footnote 3 to the Court's opinion. 
I t i s , however , t h e l a s t " f a c t o r " which i s most o f fended 
by S e n a t e B i l l 3 2 7 : i t " i n t r u d e s upon t h e a b i l i t y of t h e 
p e o p l e w i t h i n t h e m u n i c i p a l i t y t o c o n t r o l t h r o u g h t h e i r 
e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s t h e s u b s t a n t i v e p o l i c i e s which a f f e c t them 
u n i q u e l y . " S e n a t e B i l l 327 mandates f o r e v e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n in 
t h e s t a t e r e t i r e m e n t s y s t e m . T h u s , no t o n l y i s t h e g e n e r a l 
c o n c e p t ( o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n ) now beyond t h e " c o n t r o l " of t h e 
p e o p l e " t h r o u g h t h e i r ( l o c a l l y ) e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s " , bu t t h a t 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n may e n t a i l f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n r a t e s g r e a t l y 
i n e x c e s s of t h a t communi t ies a b i l i t y or d e s i r e s t o pay .2 
The Court f u r t h e r s t a t e s : 
The l e g i s l a t i o n a t i s s u e l e a v e s l o c a l u n i t s of 
g o v e r n m e n t w i t h c o m p l e t e autonomy i n d e c i d i n g 
whe ther t o o f f e r any r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s . 
98 Utah Advance R e p o r t s a t 4 1 . That i s s i m p l y u n t r u e . West 
J o r d a n u n d e r t h e t e r m s of S e n a t e B i l l 327 h a s no such 
" c o m p l e t e autonomy"! Under t h e te rms of S e n a t e B i l l 3 2 7 , i t 
MUST p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e s t a t e r e t i r e m e n t s y s t e m , FOREVER! 
Even i f s u c h i s c o n t r a r y t o w i l l of t h o s e t a x p a y e r s , a s 
e x p r e s s e d t h r o u g h t h e i r l o c a l l y - e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s . 
I t i s t h i s t y p e of v i o l a t i o n t h a t t h e Ripper C l a u s e was 
d e s i g n e d t o p r e v e n t . When S e n a t e B i l l 327 i s u n d e r s t o o d and 
i s c a r e f u l l y s c r u t i n i z e d under t h e C o u r t ' s own t e s t , i t must 
c l e a r l y f a i l ! 
This p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e i s f u r t h e r a g g r a v a t e d by t h e p r o v i s i o n s o 
t h e Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n which a r e des igned t o p r e v e n t t h i s t ype o 
a b u s e and a b r o g a t i o n of l o c a l c o n t r o l of l o c a l m o n i e s , a 
d i s c u s s e d p r e v i o u s l y in P o i n t s I I I t h r o u g h VI of A p p e l l a n t ' 
o r i g i n a l b r i e f . 
In this regard the Court's instant decision ignores the 
clear meaning of the terms (a factual dispute?) contained in 
the City's 1969 application for membership (i.e. that West 
Jordan's participation in the state system is to be "under 
such terms and conditions as are hereafter mutually approved 
by the Utah State Retirement Board, or its successor, and the 
governing body of the CITY OF WEST JORDAN") and interprets 
"silence" (on the issue of "withdrawal") within the statute 
to be evidence of perpetual membership. Instead, the exact 
opposite should be the case. Indeed, the presence of such 
language in the applications for the "police" and 
"firefighter" systems as such forms were similarly prepared 
by the Board, and not by the City-* shows the relative ease 
with which the Board had it intended perpetual 
participation be clear. It didn't. And the Court's instant 
decision ignores the decision in the recent case of Johnson 
et al vs Utah State Retirement Board, 91 Utah Advance Reports 
8 (Utah Supreme Court, 19 September 1988), in which this 
Court held that a legislative enactment "to clarify" the 
intent of previous legislation was inoperative against 
pensioners who had acted in reliance to the earlier statute. 
The instant decision makes no atempt to reconcile Johnson 
with the instant situation wherein the City and the other 
plaintiffs acted in reliance upon existing statutes, which 
the Board now claims Senate Bill 327 merely "clarified". 
3 It used to be a principle of Utah jurisprudence that ambiguity 
within a contractual document was to be construed against the 
preparer of that document: the Retirement Board! 
8 
I l l 
The Court's decision overlooked the claim of the 
"unconstitutional taking of property without just 
compensation". This issue was carefully pleaded in the 
original complaint, in violation of both the state and 
national constitutions. 
While this Court may have authority to rule on the 
interpretation of the Utah Constitution, this Court is bound 
by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
concerning the United States Constitution. 
Subsequent to the filing of the briefs in this case, the 
United States Supreme Court decided the case of First 
Lutheran Evangelical Church of Glendale vs Los Angeles 
County, US , 107 S Ct 2378 (June 9, 1987), in which 
it held that a governmental regulation (in that case, a 
zoning ordinance) which denies the owner of the property all 
use of that property is compensable under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitutions, 
even if the "taking" is "temporary". That case has 
application to the instant situation. 
Senate Bill 327 mandates that the municipal employee (at 
least, the designated named Appellants, herein) be a member 
of the state retirement system. The employee has no choice: 
he must be a member of the state system and must make 
involuntary contributions from his pay, in a percentage 
stipulated by the statute, to the system. The system then is 
able to use the employee's money. 
9 
When a member of the "police" retirement system 
terminates his employment prior to retirement and "withdraws" 
his "accumulated contributions" therefrom, as the employee is 
allowed to do, that employee receives no interest earnings on 
those contributions!^ 
Those monies are being utilized, ostensibly for a 
"public" use. Any statute which mandates such involuntary 
participation in a scheme where his "property" is taken and 
used, without the payment of "just compensation" as is 
required by the national constitution, is thus 
unconstitutional! This issue was pleaded in the original 
complaint and briefed, yet the Court's decision overlooks it. 
If a "temporary taking" of property (in a "zoning" 
context) is "unconstitutional" and thus compensable (ala 
First English), then a "temporary taking" of money (as 
contributions from the employee's own earnings, in the 
retirement context) is likewise unconstitutional! The Court 
is bound to honor the United States Constitution as the 
"supreme law of the land". 
If there is a "genuine dispute as to material facts" on 
this issue (and on other similar issues), the Court should 
remand for a trial. [The trial court's premature granting of 
the Retirement Board's motion for summary judgment prevented 
the full development of a factual record on this and other 
The Retirement Board's reason for denying interest accruals 
to those monies is that "the statute doesn't provide for it." 
10 
s i m i l a r i s s u e s * ] I n any e v e n t , the Cour t s h o u l d r e c o n c i l e i t s 
i n s t a n t d e c i s i o n w i t h t h e c o n t r o l l i n g and a p p l i c a b l e 
d e c i s i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t . 
I c e r t i f y t h a t t h e f o r e g o i n g P e t i t i o n f o r R e h e a r i n g i s 
s u b m i t t e d i n good f a i t h and not f o r t he purposes o f d e l a y . 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d t h i s 13th day o f J a n u a r y , 1989. 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f s - A p p e l l a n t s 
CERTIFICATE 
I c e r t i f y t h a t I caused f ou r cop ies o f t he f o r e g o i n g PETITION 
FOR REHEARING t o be se rved upon Mark A Madsen , A t t o r n e y f o r 
D e f e n d a n t s - R e s p o n d e n t s , 540 East 200 S o u t h , S a l t Lake C i t y , 
Utah 84102 , t h i s 13 th day o f January , 1989. 
